For linear time-invariant systems having a state matrix with uncertain sign, we formulate a minimax adaptive control problem as a zero sum dynamic game. Explicit expressions for the optimal value function and the optimal control law are given in terms of a Riccati equation. The optimal control law is adaptive in the sense the past data is used to estimate the uncertain sign for prediction of future dynamics. Once the sign has been estimated, the controller behaves like standard H ∞ optimal state feedback.
M is positive definite, while M 0 means positive semidefinite. For M, N ∈ R n×m , the expression M, N denotes the trace of M ⊤ N . Given x ∈ R n and a positive definite M ∈ R n×n , the notation |x| 2 M means x ⊤ M x. Similarly, given N ∈ R m×n and a positive definite M ∈ R n×n , the notation N 2 M means the trace of N ⊤ M N .
MINIMAX ADAPTIVE CONTROL
This paper is devoted to the following problem:
Let Q ∈ R n×n and R ∈ R m×m be positive definite matrices and let B ∈ R n×m . Given A ∈ R n×n , a number γ > 0 and an initial state x 0 , find, if possible, a control law µ that attains the infimum
where i ∈ {−1, 1}, w t ∈ R n , T ≥ 0 and the sequences x and u are generated according to x t+1 = iAx t + Bu t + w t t ≥ 0 (2) u t = µ t (x 0 , . . . , x t , u 0 , . . . , u t−1 ).
(
The problem can be viewed as a dynamic game, where the µ-player tries to minimize the cost, while the (w, i)-player tries to maximize it. If it wasn't for the parameter i, this would be the standard game formulation of H ∞ optimal control Basar and Bernhard [1995] . In our formulation, the maximizing player can choose not only w, but also the parameter i. This parameter is unknown, but constant, so an optimal feedback law tends to "learn" the value of i in the beginning, in order to exploit this knowledge later. Such nonlinear adaptive controllers can stabilize and optimize the behavior also when no linear controller can simultaneously stabilize (2) for both i = 1 and i = −1.
To accommodate the uncertainty in i when deciding u t , it is sufficient for the controller to consider historical data collected in the matrix
Our problem can thus be reformulated as follows:
Given Q ≻ 0, R ≻ 0, γ > 0 and a system
when x, u, Z are generated from v according to (5)-(6).
In this formulation, the unknown sign i does not appear in the dynamics, only in the penalty of the final state. As a consequence, no past states are needed in the control law (6), only the state (x t , Z t ). In fact, the problem is a standard zero-sum dynamic game Basar and Olsder [1999] , which can be addressed by dynamic programming. Hence we define the operator
and summarize this section by stating the following:
for all Z 0 and x ∈ R n . Then V * (x 0 , 0) is equal to the values of (1) and (7) . The minimizing argument of the right hand side in the Bellman equation defines an optimal control law η : (x, Z) → u for (7), while the control law µ defined by µ t (x 0 , . . . , x t , u 0 , . . . , u t−1 )
is optimal for (1). Conversely, if no V * exists, then (1) and (7) have no finite values.
The proof is given in section 5.
SOLUTION TO THE BELLMAN EQUATION
The following result, Theorem 2, gives an explicit expression for the minimax optimal adaptive controller for a range of γ-values. It is followed by Theorem 3, which gives a lower bound on the values of γ for which a solution exists. Theorem 2. Given A ∈ R n×n and some positive definite
Suppose that T ≺ γ 2 I and
Then the Bellman equation F V * = V * and the inequalities (8) are satisfied by
The optimal control law for the dynamic game is Remark 1. The intuition behind the optimal control law in Theorem 2 is simple: The first two cases describe the situation when historical data collected in the expression
Ax τ is rich enough to make a reliable estimate about the uncertain parameter i. This estimate is then used used as truth and the corresponding H ∞ state feedback control law is applied. In the third case, the historical data does not give a conclusive answer, so the controller gain is down-scaled accordingly.
Remark 2. If n = m = Q = R = A = B = 1, then Theorem 2 gives an optimal strategy for the dynamic game (7) whenever γ > 2.13. On the other hand, Theorem 3 shows that the game has no finite value unless γ ≥ 2.01. More details will be given in Section 6.
THE MAIN PROOFS.
First consider a more limited problem: min
where Y is an arbitrary matrix parameter. In other words:
The problem is to find a control signal u to minimize a worst case quadratic cost for ±A, with Y representing prior knowledge.
The solution is given by the following lemma:
where the minimizing u is given by u = −Kx with
and the minimizing value of u is
Proof. The definition of K gives
Multiplication by K ⊤ from the left, and application of the identity
The minimax theorem for convex-concave functions gives
Moreover, if A, Y ≥ |x| 2 Π , the maximum over θ is attained by θ 1 = 0 and the value is |x| 2 P + 2 A, Y . On the other hand, if A, Y ≤ −|x| 2 Π , the maximum is given by θ 1 = 1 and the value is |x| 2
, the optimal value of θ 1 is in the interior of the interval [0, 1] and determined by
This gives u = |x| −2 Π A, Y Kx and the value
Equipped with Lemma 4, together with Lemma 7 in the Appendix, we are now ready to prove the main result:
Proof of Theorem 2. Putting S := (P −1 − γ −2 I) −1 and eliminating v from the definition of P gives (12). Let
and notice that U (x, Z) ≤ γ 2 |x| 2 for Z 0.
We will first prove that F V ≤ U . Lemma 4 gives
Our next step will to prove that F U ≤ F V . For this, we consider u defined by (14). Let X := (T −1 − γ −2 I) −1 and θ := | u|/|Kx|. Then
where the first inequality is proved in Lemma 7 and the second follows from convexity in θ. Hence, it follows from the definition of U that
Finally, the definition V * := F V gives V ≤ V * ≤ U and therefore F V ≤ F V * ≤ F U . The fact that the upper and lower bound are equal implies that F V = F V * , so V * solves the Bellman equation V * = F V * as stated. Moreover, the inequalities (8) follow from the fact that
It remains to verify the expression for the optimal control law η(x, Z). We know from the inequalities V ≤ V * ≤ U combined with (16) that
The minimizer of the right hand side is u, which therefore must be a minimizer also for the left hand side. Hence it is the minimizing argument of the Bellman equation and is therefore equal to the optimal control law.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that the Bellman equation F V * = V * has a solution satisfying the inequalities (8). Define recursively
where the matrix sequence P 0 P 1 P 2 . . . is obtained from P 0 = 0 and the Riccati recursion
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that (1) takes the form
where i ∈ {−1, 1}, w t ∈ R n , T ≥ 0 and the sequences x and u are generated according to (2)-(3). Note that supremum over T is obtained as T → ∞, since w can be turned off at any time to make the remaining cost nonnegative. A change of variables with v t = x t+1 and Z t given by (4) shows that (1) is equal to
where x, Z, u are generated by (5) combined with (3). For k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., define the monotonically increasing
Standard dynamic programming shows that
and the infimum is attained by the policy defining u t as the minimizing argument of
Suppose now that the Bellman equation F V * = V * has a solution satisfying (8). Then lim k→∞ V k = V * , so the value of (17) is V * (x 0 , 0) and the infimum is attained by the policy defining u t from (x t , Z t ) as the minimizing argument of
This proves that (1) and (7) are equal and have the stated minimizing arguments. Conversely, if no solution V * exists, the sequence V 0 , V 1 , V 2 , . . . has no upper bound, so (1) and (7) have no finite values.
EXAMPLE
Recall the case n = m = Q = R = A = B = 1 from Remark 2 in section 4. We will now consider the statements of Theorem 2 in more detail. First put γ = 2.13. Solving the Riccati equation
gives P = 1.738, which is clearly in the interval [0, γ 2 ]. It follows that S = 2.825, T = 3.825 and condition (10) marginally holds, since the right hand side takes the value 3.824. It is easy to see that for larger γ, the margin would be bigger.
An exact expression for the value function V * = F V can now be computed using formula (13) in Lemma 4. This shows that
and for | A, Y | in between, the Y -dependence in V * is quadratic.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have formulated a control problem for uncertain linear systems as a zero-sum dynamic game. The solution is remarkable for two reasons:
(1) The corresponding dynamic programming formulation has an explicit solution in terms of a Riccati equation.
(2) The resulting optimal controller is adaptive: It reduces the aggressiveness of the controller until until enough data has been collected to get a parameter estimate that can be confidently trusted.
The results are likely to be extendable to many other uncertainty structures. The case of uncertain input matrix B will be particularly important, since the controller then needs to make active exploration in order to collect enough data for the exploitation phase.
